# Security

> Public summary of Messajo's threat model, how each sensitive piece of data is stored and how to report a vulnerability.

This page summarizes the `1.0.0` security review: the system's boundaries, the controls on each one and how sensitive data is stored. The review follows the [OWASP API Security Top 10 (2023)](https://owasp.org/API-Security/editions/2023/en/0x11-t10/) and a STRIDE analysis per boundary.

## Boundaries and controls

| Boundary | Controls |
|---|---|
| Meta → incoming webhooks | `X-Hub-Signature-256` signature checked in constant time over the raw body; body up to 5 MiB; raw body deduplication; a channel without credentials answers `503` |
| Meta → Flows endpoint → your handler | Meta's signature, failure limit per IP and exchange limit per Flow, decryption with the account key; the handler gets the request signed with `Messajo-Signature`, only over public `https` |
| Your application → `/v1` and WebSocket | API key with permissions and connection scope; per-key and per-organization limits; body cap per route; unknown fields rejected; every read filters by the key's organization |
| Browser → panel and public pages | `HttpOnly` session cookie, 2FA required for owners and admins, `Origin` check on writes, CSP and security headers; public pages (connection links, invites, data deletion) with per-IP limits |
| Messajo → your destinations | HMAC-SHA256 signature on every delivery; anti-SSRF that resolves DNS, rejects private IPs and connects to the checked IP |
| Messajo → Meta's Graph | fixed origin; tokens encrypted in the database; responses validated before use |
| Operator | super-admin, queues and `/metrics` behind their own authentication; logs with automatic secret redaction |
| Supply chain | pinned versions, `bun audit` and secret scanning in CI; the image runs without `root` |

Every server route has a declared policy (authentication, limit and maximum body); a test fails CI if a route appears without one.

## Sensitive data

| Data | How it is kept |
|---|---|
| Meta tokens, number PIN, Flow private key | encrypted (AES-256-GCM) in the database; the API shows at most the last 4 characters |
| Destination and Flow handler secrets | encrypted; shown only in the response that generates them |
| API keys, connection link tokens | hash only |
| SIP credential | not kept: passed to Meta and shown once |
| OTP code | not stored; message, events and logs carry the masked code ([Authentication templates](/en/guides/authentication-templates/)) |
| Call SDP (contact's IP) | deleted 1 h after the call ends; the API only shows `has_sdp` |
| Data typed into a Flow with an endpoint | not stored; Messajo only keeps the exchange metadata, for 7 days |
| Messages, contacts and media | organization retention (90 days by default), export and erasure in [Data and privacy](/en/operate/data-privacy/) |

## Reporting a vulnerability

**Do not open a public issue.** Write to `security@messajo.com`, with the description, the version, steps to reproduce and how you want to be credited.

| Step | Deadline |
|---|---|
| Acknowledgment | within 72 business hours |
| Initial assessment | within 7 days |
| Public disclosure | within 90 days of the report, or sooner if the fix is out |

The full policy is in the repository's `SECURITY.md`.
