Operations
Security
Public summary of Messajo's threat model, how each sensitive piece of data is stored and how to report a vulnerability.
This page summarizes the 1.0.0 security review: the system’s boundaries, the controls on each one and how sensitive data is stored. The review follows the OWASP API Security Top 10 (2023) and a STRIDE analysis per boundary.
Boundaries and controls
Section titled “Boundaries and controls”| Boundary | Controls |
|---|---|
| Meta → incoming webhooks | X-Hub-Signature-256 signature checked in constant time over the raw body; body up to 5 MiB; raw body deduplication; a channel without credentials answers 503 |
| Meta → Flows endpoint → your handler | Meta’s signature, failure limit per IP and exchange limit per Flow, decryption with the account key; the handler gets the request signed with Messajo-Signature, only over public https |
Your application → /v1 and WebSocket |
API key with permissions and connection scope; per-key and per-organization limits; body cap per route; unknown fields rejected; every read filters by the key’s organization |
| Browser → panel and public pages | HttpOnly session cookie, 2FA required for owners and admins, Origin check on writes, CSP and security headers; public pages (connection links, invites, data deletion) with per-IP limits |
| Messajo → your destinations | HMAC-SHA256 signature on every delivery; anti-SSRF that resolves DNS, rejects private IPs and connects to the checked IP |
| Messajo → Meta’s Graph | fixed origin; tokens encrypted in the database; responses validated before use |
| Operator | super-admin, queues and /metrics behind their own authentication; logs with automatic secret redaction |
| Supply chain | pinned versions, bun audit and secret scanning in CI; the image runs without root |
Every server route has a declared policy (authentication, limit and maximum body); a test fails CI if a route appears without one.
Sensitive data
Section titled “Sensitive data”| Data | How it is kept |
|---|---|
| Meta tokens, number PIN, Flow private key | encrypted (AES-256-GCM) in the database; the API shows at most the last 4 characters |
| Destination and Flow handler secrets | encrypted; shown only in the response that generates them |
| API keys, connection link tokens | hash only |
| SIP credential | not kept: passed to Meta and shown once |
| OTP code | not stored; message, events and logs carry the masked code (Authentication templates) |
| Call SDP (contact’s IP) | deleted 1 h after the call ends; the API only shows has_sdp |
| Data typed into a Flow with an endpoint | not stored; Messajo only keeps the exchange metadata, for 7 days |
| Messages, contacts and media | organization retention (90 days by default), export and erasure in Data and privacy |
Reporting a vulnerability
Section titled “Reporting a vulnerability”Do not open a public issue. Write to [email protected], with the description, the version, steps to reproduce and how you want to be credited.
| Step | Deadline |
|---|---|
| Acknowledgment | within 72 business hours |
| Initial assessment | within 7 days |
| Public disclosure | within 90 days of the report, or sooner if the fix is out |
The full policy is in the repository’s SECURITY.md.